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Article 7

Expert Evidence, Partisanship,
and Epistemic Competence
Jennifer L. Mnookin†
In various ways, skilled witnesses have been used in
courtroom processes since just about the dawn of the jury trial.
The expert witness in its modern form—a witness whose
presence in court results not from being a percipient witness to
material facts, but instead because of education, training,
experience, or other specialized knowledge relevant to the case,
and who is called by one party to testify, and is typically
compensated by that party as well—can be traced back to at
least the middle of the nineteenth century.
But the use of adversarial expert witnesses in court has
been problematic from just about the moment of its invention.
In this brief essay, I will explore two fundamental causes of the
awkward fit between expert knowledge and our adjudicatory
processes: the twin problems of partisanship and epistemic
competence.
The use of expert evidence in court has been criticized
for a remarkably long time. Consider the following three
quotations:
But the practice [of using expert witnesses] under the present
method has for years exhibited shortcomings which are lamentable. . . . The principal feature of the breakdown seems to be the
distrust of the expert witness as one whose testimony is shaped
by his bias for the party calling him. That bias itself is due, partly
to the special fee which has been paid or promised him, and partly to
his prior consultation with the party and his self-committal to a
particular view. His candid scientific opinion thus has had no fair
opportunity of expression, or even of formation, swerved as he is by
this partisan committal.1

†
Vice Dean for Faculty & Research and Professor of Law, UCLA School of
Law. I thank the participants for an engaging and provocative symposium and
particularly Margaret Berger and Larry Solan for organizing it. Thanks also to Jennie
Katz and Janelle Ureta for research assistance.
1
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563 (2d ed. 1923) (paragraph break omitted).
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Experts in other fields see lawyers as unprincipled manipulators of
their disciplines, and lawyers and experts alike see expert
witnesses—those members of other learned professions who will
consort with lawyers—as whores.2
Now in the present instance I have, as usual, the evidence of experts
on the one side and on the other, and, as usual, the experts do not
agree in their opinion. There is no reason why they should. . . . A
man may go . . . to half-a-dozen experts. . . . He takes their honest
opinions, he finds three in his favor and three against him; he says
to the three in his favor, “will you be kind enough to give evidence?”
And he pays the three against him their fees and leaves them alone;
the other side does the same. It may not be three out of six, it may be
three out of fifty. I was told in one case, where a person wanted a
certain thing done, that they went to sixty-eight people before they
found one. . . . [T]herefore I have always the greatest possible
distrust of scientific evidence of this kind.3

These views span more than a century, but they sound a
remarkably consistent note. Though the rhetorical styles are
quite different, the underlying message is strikingly similar:
Expert witnesses in court are often not deserving of our
confidence. Their conclusions cannot be relied upon, and their
words cannot be trusted. Indeed, a century’s worth of writing
about expert evidence circles around the same themes and
consistently reaches the same conclusion: that the use of partyselected expert witnesses in an adversarial legal system is
fraught with difficulties.4
Why is this so? At root, the use of expertise in our
adversarial system raises two equally significant fundamental
dilemmas: the problem of partisanship and the problem of
epistemic competence. First, given that experts are called by
one party and paid by that party, there is an inevitable danger
of bias in favor of that party. The less extreme version of this
concern is that as the expert prepares for and becomes
enmeshed in the case, he will increasingly, if unconsciously,

2

Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1991).
Thorn v. Worthing Skating Rink Co., L.R. 6 Ch.D. 415, 416 (1876) (Jessel,
M.R.), quoted in Plimpton v. Spiller, L.R. 6 Ch.D. 412, 415 n.2 (1877).
4
For a look at the history of anxieties surrounding the use of expert
evidence in court, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts:
An Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILLA. L. REV. 763 (2007); see also TAL
GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE 5-51 (2004); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT
THE BAR 42-68 (1995); JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW (1993); Christopher
Hamlin, Scientific Method and Expert Witnessing: Victorian Perspectives on a Modern
Problem, 16 SOC. STUD. SCI. 485, 488-89 (1986); Stephan Landsman, Of Witches,
Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony,
13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 139 (1995).
3
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side with the party that hired him, lose some degree of
objectivity, and slant his testimony in that party’s favor. The
more dramatic version of the same fear is that some
unscrupulous experts will literally offer themselves for hire,
selling their opinions and their credentials to anyone who
meets their price.5
Despite these dangers, refusing to permit payment to
experts is obviously not a viable option. It is wholly unrealistic
to imagine that those highly qualified experts whom we want
to have participating in our adjudicatory process would (or
should) devote their time and energy to the courts pro bono on
a regular basis. Preparing for and testifying for trial can be
extremely time consuming, and experts can otherwise be
spending that time engaging in other professionally and/or
economically remunerative activities, or enjoying their favorite
leisure activities. Hardly anyone would view giving expert
testimony as one of her favorite leisure-time activities. The
reality is that experts must be paid.
The acute difficulty comes not simply from the fact of
payment, but rather from the fact that it is the parties who
choose and pay their experts. What a particular party views as
the greatest value for its dollar—effective expert testimony
that persuades the factfinder—will often not be commensurate
with what a more systemic perspective would see as most
valuable, which would presumably be careful, accurate expert
testimony rather than testimony most persuasive to a nonexpert. What this means is that those witnesses who succeed in
the marketplace for experts within our adversarial process will
often not be those with the most knowledge or actual expertise
in a particular area, but rather those whom parties believe will
succeed in persuading the factfinder. The confluence of
adversarialism with the need for expert information also has
permitted the creation of a class of “professional” expert
witnesses, those for whom expert witnessing is no longer a
sideline, a once-in-a-while add-on to their primary work as a
physician, economist, epidemiologist, statistician, or whatnot,
but rather is now a significant, or even primary, source of their
5

For the classic (pre-Daubert) article on the widespread frustration with the
use of expert evidence and the structural problems with the use of expert knowledge in
an adversarial system with lay fact-finders, see Gross, supra note 2. For a polemical
but influential account of the problems with the use of expert evidence in civil cases,
see PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
For a description of the significant concerns about partisanship in the late nineteenth
century, see Mnookin, supra note 4.
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earnings.6 This group, obviously, has an especially strong
interest in maintaining its marketability by being a “team
player,” and telling potential employers (that is, parties) what
they want to hear. The marketplace for experts cannot,
therefore, be trusted to produce reliable information.7 To
whatever extent price can be correlated with quality in other
domains, the relationship cannot be counted on with respect to
expert witnesses.
The second fundamental problem with the adversarial
expert is epistemic. Experts are necessary precisely because of
what the jury does not know.8 They are supposed to provide
information useful to the jury’s decision-making that goes
beyond what a jury would know without their assistance. But if
the jury lacks the knowledge that the expert provides, how,
then, can it rationally evaluate the expertise on offer?9 To be
6
As part of tort reform efforts, several states have attempted to curb
“professional experts” in medical malpractice cases by statutory provisions limiting
who can testify as an expert. Kansas, for example, requires that testifying experts have
spent at least fifty percent of the two years preceding the incident giving rise to the
claim in “actual clinical practice.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3412 (2007). Connecticut
requires a testifying expert to have been active in the practice or teaching of medicine
within the five years preceding the incident giving rise to the claim. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-184c (2007). Michigan requires a testifying medical expert to have spent a
majority of the year preceding the incident giving rise to the claim engaged in active
clinical practice or teaching. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2169 (2008).
7
For an interesting look at the dynamics of the expert market, see Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and
Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2001). For a more optimistic perspective,
see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert
Witness, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 91.
8
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which controls the use of expert testimony,
states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702. In order to “assist the trier of fact,” the expert testimony must go
beyond what the trier of fact would have known and understood even without the
expert.
9
As Learned Hand wrote in his well-known 1901 article about expert
evidence:
The trouble with all this is that it is setting the jury to decide, where doctors
disagree. The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts, as we
have seen, but general truths derived from his specialized experience. But
how can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an
experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they
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sure, one might not need to be an expert in order to assess
expertise, but the main mechanisms for assessing expertise
outside of one’s domain of knowledge are, by necessity,
secondary indicia, proxies: demeanor, perhaps, or credentials,
or superficial explanatory plausibility. But because each party
has the power to select its experts from the whole universe of
experts willing to testify, parties will presumably attempt to
select those experts who best satisfy the parties’ best guesses
about what the jury will use as its proxy criteria. That might be
a Ph.D. from a prestigious institution or a lengthy publication
record. Perhaps it is certain forms of speech or dress, or an
honest face and a winning testimonial manner. Most likely it is
a mixture of all of the above and more. Whatever the specific
criteria, the point is that parties (sometimes with the help of
jury consultants) will deliberately select experts who satisfy
their beliefs about the jury’s expectations for experts. Parties
will, quite rationally, seek out precisely those experts most
capable of “performing” the role of expert in just the way that
the parties expect that a jury will find credible. Parties do not
have infinite latitude, as they will have to choose from
whatever array of experts is willing to testify in a way that
substantively helps their case. But compared to fact witnesses,
they have a great deal of leeway.10 With fact witnesses, a party
is typically severely limited by the happenstance of who was
there and who saw what; not so with expert witnesses, who can
be selected from a national or even global pool, resources
permitting. As a result, the power of proxy criteria, like
demeanor or credentials, to discriminate between reliable and
unreliable experts is likely to be quite limited indeed.11

are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all. . . . What
hope have the jury, or any other layman, of a rational decision between two
such conflicting statements each based upon such experience.
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54-55 (1901).
10
Gross, supra note 2, at 1126-28.
11
Demeanor as a signal for credibility may not be particularly accurate
outside of the expert context either. See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the
Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness
Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157 (1993); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991). My point, however, is not to defend (or attack) demeanor
as an accurate means by which to detect honesty, but simply to suggest that whatever
degree of utility it has for the assessment of credibility for non-expert evidence, it is
significantly diminished vis-à-vis experts themselves because parties can select them
precisely for their demeanor.
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Moreover, the problem of epistemic competence compounds the problem of partisanship. Because the jury does
not have the expertise to evaluate the substance of expert
testimony, it is unlikely that it will be an accurate evaluator
of partisan bias. If the jury has epistemic competence, we may
not need to be overly concerned with partisanship. The jury can
independently evaluate the substance of the testimony and
will often have the capacity to see through overstatements or
inaccuracies that were the result of zealotry. Without epistemic
competence, the jury has no choice but to rely on proxies as
secondary indicia of bias, and these may often be either
inaccurate or difficult to evaluate.
For example, does the $550 per hour received by the
expert mean that his testimony should be discounted because
he is reaping a tidy profit, or does it reflect his high stature and
commensurate ability that commands an appropriately high
price? Is it a sign of trouble that an expert has testified dozens
of times before, and thus might be an “expert for hire,” or is it a
positive sign, showing that other judges have already deemed
him sufficiently expert to warrant being heard by the jury?
Does the fact that the plaintiff’s expert seems to testify
exclusively for plaintiffs suggest a deep-seated bias, or is the
expert who testifies for plaintiffs and defendants alike a bigger
concern, possibly suggesting that he will testify for anyone who
meets his price? How much, if it all, should a published study
in a peer-reviewed journal be discounted because it was funded
by a private entity, such as a drug company, with an interest in
the outcome of the research conducted? On the one hand, such
a funding source could generate a bias; on the other hand, the
structure of academic research and the processes of peer review
and publication are designed, at least aspirationally, to check
such a bias. What about a study conducted especially for this
lawsuit? Is its trustworthiness diminished because it did not
emerge through the typical research process,12 or is it the quite
appropriate result of an expert, or community of experts,
developing an interest in the relevant question precisely
because of the lawsuit itself? The point is not that secondary
indicia can never provide information relevant to an evaluation
of partisanship—rather, it is that evaluating these secondary

12
This is precisely what Judge Kozinski suggested in his opinion on remand
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (1995).
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indicia is a murky and imperfect process given the combination
of (1) adversarialism and (2) a lack of epistemic competence.
These are not new problems. They are, in fact, rather
old problems. Indeed, the risks posed by expert testimony—the
danger of partisanship and the problem of epistemic
competence—have long been recognized, but never fully
resolved, especially when considered together. And hence we
continue to face these problems—in court, in our scholarship,
in the jury room. Given these fundamental and seemingly
irresolvable problems with experts in court, what is the law
to do?
In what follows, Part I will survey the traditional,
historical approaches the law has taken in attempting to
resolve these central problems of partisanship and epistemic
competence. Part II will then consider potential solutions to
these fundamental quandaries, evaluating both the theoretical
appeal and pitfalls of these approaches.
I.

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE SPORTING THEORY,
FRYE, AND DAUBERT

First, let us look at what the law has done. The
traditional common law approach to these structural dilemmas
was quite simply the adversarial mechanism itself: both parties
had an equal opportunity to make use of expert witnesses if
they wished to do so. Yes, the witnesses for each party might
tend to partisanship, but somehow from their clashing
testimony, the jury in its infinite wisdom would distill the
truth—or at least that was the hope. It was a “sporting theory
of justice” applied to experts: so long as parties had an equal
opportunity to bring forward opposing experts, under the same
rules and with the same judge as umpire, then whatever the
jury made of the competing experts’ stories was acceptable.13
This approach, however, was roundly criticized as early
as the closing decades of the nineteenth century.14 The problem
was the lack of epistemic competence: if juries could be counted
on to have the ability to assess the expertise before them, then
a level adversarial-playing field might indeed have been all
that was needed. But given that juries often lacked the
13

On the sporting theory of justice, see Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM. LAW. 445, 447-48 (1906).
14
For a detailed look at views about expert evidence at the end of the
nineteenth century, see generally Mnookin, supra note 4.
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competence to adequately evaluate the expertise on offer, the
“sporting theory of justice” had the effect, as Roscoe Pound
noted, of turning “expert witnesses[] into partisans pure and
simple.”15
Although critiques of expert testimony have been both
frequent and strongly worded over the course of the twentieth
century, the adversarial expert has remained an increasingly
significant feature of the adversarial trial. And for the most
part, despite criticisms, the adversarial process itself remained
the dominant check, such as it was, on expert testimony until
quite recently.
There were, to be sure, some earlier fledgling efforts to
regulate the content of expert testimony through limitations on
admissibility. The Frye rule, articulated in 1923, made explicit
that for novel kinds of expert testimony, courts could require
the knowledge to have gained “general acceptance” in the
relevant expert community before permitting it before a jury.16
But Frye, though it became important in the 1970s, was not
much noticed at the time it was decided. Through 1970, it was
cited only fifty-eight times, and the bulk of those cases involved
the lie detector, the same technology at issue in Frye.17
Instead, the main vehicle for such regulation as the
courts wished to exercise was qualifications: in order to testify,
the expert had to have qualifications that were adequate to
support his claim of expertise. Just how qualified was qualified
enough? No doctrinal framework emerged to answer this
question, and in practice, most judges, most of the time, did not
actually interrogate a proposed experts’ bona fides in a detailed
or rigorous way. In addition, trial judges’ determinations about
qualifications were generally viewed as so much a matter of the
trial court’s discretion as to be virtually unreviewable on
15

Pound, supra note 13, at 448.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye’s now
classic and oft-quoted key language says:
16

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle of discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.
Id.
17
This is based on a search for cases reported by Lexis decided prior to 1970
that cite Frye.
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appeal.18 In practice, then, the only significant check on
partisanship or even outright charlatanry was the power of the
opposing attorney to cross-examine the expert. Even if one did
agree with John Henry Wigmore that, as a general matter,
cross-examination counted as “the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth,”19 it was often not terribly
effective when applied to expert witnesses.20
The net result was that although few defended it as
sound, the “sporting theory” as applied to expert witnesses
continued to reign even into the last quarter of the twentieth
century. Few doubted that this sporting theory sometimes led
to embarrassing results.21 Some critics began suggesting that
the inadequate regulation of expert witnesses was even
contributing to a liability crisis, in which socially valuable
products were being forced off the market because of the cost of
defending against baseless tort suits. These critics’ idea was
that such lawsuits often lacked scientific merit, but plaintiffs’
lawyers were nonetheless able to hoodwink the jury into
granting sizeable verdicts. And, according to the critics, these
suits were able to get past summary judgment and reach trial
precisely because of the presence of hubristic experts prepared
to testify to causation with little or no basis in fact.22
This, then, was the historical backdrop for the Supreme
Court’s 1993 pronouncement on expert evidence, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.23 As a formal matter,
Daubert held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, which became
effective in 1975, did not incorporate the Frye principle of
18

1 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 561, 670.
Id. vol. 3, § 1367.
20
For a satirical look from the late nineteenth century making fun of several
kinds of expert witnesses (and illustrating the ineffectiveness of efforts to crossexamine them), see RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY (St. Louis, Central Law
Journal Co., 9th ed. 1892) (1880).
21
For one classic example on the civil side, see Maihafer ex rel. Wells v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985). This case, a bench trial in
which the judge believed the plaintiffs’ experts who alleged that spermicide caused
birth defects, has been much criticized. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 2, at 1121-24. But
see Joseph L. Gastwirth, The Need for Careful Evaluation of Epidemiological Evidence
in Product Liability Cases: A Reexamination of Wells v. Ortho and Key
Pharmaceuticals, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK, 151, 163-89 (2003). For some examples
of embarrassingly unsupported expert evidence admitted on the criminal side, see, e.g.,
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007), and Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997).
22
The classic account making this argument is HUBER, supra note 5.
23
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19
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“general acceptance.”24 While rejecting the allegedly “austere
standard” of Frye, Daubert parsed the language of Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and interpreted the rule’s use of
the words “scientific . . . knowledge” to mean that federal
judges have an obligation to serve as “gatekeepers,” who make
sure that scientific evidence offered in court is, in fact,
“scientific knowledge.”25 By emphasizing a judicial gatekeeping
role for the assessment of expert evidence, Daubert was a
meaningful move away from a pure “sporting theory” with
respect to expert evidence.
Tracing the history of expert evidence, Daubert
completes a shift in perspective whose outlines were already
implicitly visible in Frye. Prior to Frye (and to a great extent
afterwards as well), the key concern was qualifications: Is this
“expert” an appropriate person to speak to the issue at hand?
Does this person, through training, experience, or education
have the right kind of expertise? Do his credentials qualify him
to give the jury an opinion on this matter? The courts, to be
sure, were not typically extremely strict about qualifications—
physicians, for example, were often permitted to testify outside
their primary area of expertise, and somewhat weak credentials were often seen as going to evidentiary weight rather than
admissibility—but still, qualifications were the primary hook
by which judges evaluated an expert’s authority. The Frye test,
by contrast, was less concerned with the speaker and his
qualifications and was more concerned with the substance
being asserted: had the speaker’s claims reached general
acceptance in the relevant field? At least in theory, an
indisputably qualified expert, even though testifying to matters
within his sphere of expertise, could still be excluded under
Frye because his conclusions lacked general acceptance within
the appropriate expert community.
But well after 1923 many courts ignored Frye, and even
those courts that followed it often applied it in a form that
reverted back to a qualifications test. They found that the test
was satisfied so long as the properly qualified expert asserted
that the substance of his claims was, in fact, generally
accepted. Why should a court believe an expert’s say-so about
general acceptance? Why, precisely because the expert had the
appropriate qualifications. Not only does such logic have a
24
25

Id. at 588.
Id. at 589-91.
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certain unavoidable circularity, but to the extent a credentialed
expert’s own say-so is deemed adequate to establish general
acceptance, a test that seems superficially different in form
amounts to nothing but another version of a qualifications test.
Daubert, by contrast, makes clear that for scientific evidence,
qualifications alone ought not to suffice. The speaker’s
individual expertise is still necessary, but it is no longer
sufficient. Rather, the key question is whether the substance
offered by the speaker has adequate indicia of reliability.26
Daubert thus marks a doctrinal shift away from a focus on the
speaker as a person and toward a focus on the validity of the
claims made.
More generally, Daubert was certainly a response to the
twin concerns about partisanship and the epistemic
competence of juries. As always, adequate qualifications
remain a necessary prerequisite, but after Daubert, it is crystal
clear that an expert’s qualifications are not, themselves, a
sufficient condition for admissibility. Instead, the judge must
examine the substance of the expert testimony to see whether
it is adequately reliable. Counter-expertise introduced by an
opposing party can, after Daubert, no longer be said to be an
adequate cure for the problem of partisanship; rather, judges
must themselves establish that the expert evidence has
adequate indicia of reliability.
But even though Daubert can be seen as something of a
response to the twin concerns of partisanship and epistemic
competence, it can hardly be said to resolve these issues.
Daubert’s approach is to have a non-scientist judge make a
preliminary determination about reliability in order to limit
what the jury can consider. Nothing in Daubert explicitly
addresses partisanship (though to be sure, part of the purpose
of gate-keeping for reliability is to endeavor to distinguish
partisan excess from legitimate expertise). And, as many have
suggested, beginning with Rehnquist in his Daubert dissent
and continuing as a leitmotif, it is far from clear that judges
have the epistemic competence to make legitimate decisions
about what expert evidence is adequately valid and what is
not.27

26
27

Id. at 589-90.
See id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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PARTISANSHIP AND EPISTEMIC COMPETENCE:
CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

If Daubert represents, at best, an indirect and partial
effort to address the issues of partisanship and epistemic
competence, what would more direct efforts look like? In what
follows, I want to suggest, unfortunately, just how difficult it is
to solve these problems. I will briefly address the two most
obvious and often-proposed solutions for the twin difficulties of
partisanship and epistemic competence, and will suggest, alas,
that that these solutions offer less than meets the eye—that
upon reflection, they are not in fact satisfying solutions to the
problems besetting expert testimony.
First, let us look at solutions that face up to these
fundamental tensions directly. If the problems with expert
evidence in the adversary system are partisanship and
epistemic competence, it might seem like the obvious solution
is to take on one, the other, or both. How might this be done?
For partisanship, it would seem that the obvious solution is to
make experts non-partisan—to make them neutral or court
appointed, answering to someone other than one of the parties.
For epistemic competence, it would seem like the obvious
solution would be to employ decision-makers or arbiters with
epistemic competence: in other words, expert judges or expert
juries.
Each of these solutions has been suggested before. Each
will no doubt be suggested again. If history is any guide, we are
unlikely to head terribly far down either path within the trial
process itself. I want to suggest, however, that while each of
these potential solutions does address one piece of the
underlying structural dilemma, neither offers a sound
alternative for resolving the fundamental structural tensions
as a whole.
A.

Partisanship, Neutral Experts, and Evidence Synthesis

Back in 1901, the young Learned Hand penned a stillcited article examining the difficulties posed by the use of
expert evidence. His proposed solution was to create a system
for neutral, court-appointed experts, unbiased advisors who
would be able to deliver to the jury “those general truths,
applicable to the issue, which they may treat as final and
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decisive.”28 Hand was far from the first to think that neutral
experts were a promising way to solve the problems associated
with experts in court,29 and throughout the century that
followed a great number of subsequent critics proposed
variations on the same solution.30 There have been proposals
for court-appointed experts, for government-appointed experts;
for neutrals in lieu of party-controlled experts, for neutrals as a
supplement to party-controlled experts, for incentive schemes
to encourage opposing parties to agree on a neutral expert, and
so on. For our purposes, the great variety of possible
institutional designs for the use of neutral experts is not the
point.31
The idea of neutrals is obviously an attractive corrective
to the problem of partisanship. If one of the significant
problems with the use of expertise in court is that that experts
tend to be biased in favor of the party that hired them, then
creating a category of expert that lacks this bias would seem
like a natural way to improve the information available to the
factfinder. The main advantage neutral experts would offer is
precisely that they would not be (metaphorically) in bed with
one of the parties.
To the extent experts are corrupted by their association
with the parties, the use of neutral experts could indeed be
beneficial. But to see them as a panacea misunderstands the
nature of most scientific disputes that arise at trial. Neutrals
will only offer an adequate solution to the problems besetting
the use of experts in court when, in fact, there is a reasonably
high degree of consensus within the scientific community on
the scientific question at issue in the case.

28
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 55 (1901).
29
For still earlier calls for neutral or court appointed experts, see, e.g.,
Emory Washburn, Testimony of Experts, 1 AM. L. REV. 45, 61-62 (1867); J.B. Ransom,
Medical Expert Testimony, 16 MEDICO-LEG. J. 30, 31-34 (1899); Henry Mott, Expert
Testimony, 11 MEDICO-LEG. J. 44, 45 (1893); Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in
the Conduct of Judicial Inquiries, 21 AM. L. REV. 571, 577 (1887).
30
For a sampling of these more contemporary calls for the greater use of
neutral or court appointed experts, see MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH
OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); Gross, supra
note 2; Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Impact of Daubert and Its Progeny on
the Admissibility of Behavioral and Social Science Evidence, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L.
3 (1999).
31
Note, however, that under current law, courts do have the power to appoint
experts when they deem it necessary. See FED. R. EVID. 706. This power, however, is
rarely exercised.
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Some of the time, this is no doubt the case. By the time
Daubert went to trial, for example, the question of whether the
drug Bendectin, frequently prescribed to treat acute morning
sickness during pregnancy, was teratogenic had received an
enormous amount of scientific attention (in significant part due
to the wave of litigation surrounding it). Though there were
still credentialed scientists who disagreed (some of whom were
hired by the plaintiffs), it is fair to say that the great weight of
scientific opinion interpreted the existing evidence as sufficient
in quantity and quality to strongly support the inference that
Bendectin was not teratogenic.32
But in many cases, there may be genuine disagreement
across the scientific community about how to interpret the
existing evidence on causation. Take a toxic torts case in which
the plaintiff claims that her harm resulted from exposure to a
substance produced by the defendant. Often the key issue in
such cases is causation; there may be no doubt that the
plaintiff was harmed, but the question is whether it was the
defendant’s product that caused the harm. Frequently, when
plaintiffs bring suit, there will not be as much direct evidence
on the question of causation as practicing scientists would hope
to see before rendering a judgment about causation, because
the studies that could, in theory, provide this information have
quite simply never been conducted. The plaintiff might have a
variety of suggestive pieces of data from a variety of fields—
perhaps a mixture of animal studies, chemical structure
evidence, toxicology, and epidemiology, though perhaps the
epidemiological studies are based on populations dissimilar to
the plaintiff, or exposure rates that differ dramatically, or
perhaps look at different, but chemically related, substances to
the one at issue in the case. This was the case, at least
arguably, in General Electric v. Joiner, the second of the
Supreme Court’s trilogy on expert evidence.33 It is quite often
the case in toxic tort litigation that the quantum of data
investigating the question of causation is simply less
voluminous than one would like. Such was the case with
Parlodel, a lactation-suppressing drug removed from the
32
See generally MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS,
BENDECTIN ON TRIAL (1998); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony
on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
33
See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1997). The Court
upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude the plaintiff’s expert evidence and grant
summary judgment with respect to PCB exposure. Id. at 146-47
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market by the Food and Drug Administration when concerns
emerged about whether it might be spurring strokes in some
women who took it after childbirth.34
Moreover, when a toxic tort claim involves a rare event
rather than a potential mass tort, research on causation will
almost certainly be scarce or even non-existent. In Zuchowicz v.
United States, for example, the plaintiff claimed that the
negligent misprescription of an overdose of the drug Danocrine
caused her to develop an extremely rare and often fatal illness,
primary pulmonary hypertension (“PPH”).35 Quite apart from
the fact that there were, for obvious reasons, no studies of
whether overdoses of that drug caused PPH, there was quite
scant evidence on the question of whether Danocrine was
capable in the first place of causing PPH: nothing more than a
set of speculative claims by a pharmacologist who had a theory
about how Danocrine could cause a series of hormonal
imbalances that could, in combination, cause physical problems
leading to PPH, coupled with testimony by the plaintiff’s
treating physician, a leading pulmonologist, whose conclusions
about causation were based in significant part on expertise in
other drugs that cause pulmonary disease.36 The lack of other
available evidence was in no way the plaintiff’s fault. The
likelihood that extremely rare events will have been carefully
studied is, well, extremely low. And even for toxic tort claims
that affect a significant number of people, there may be quite
limited evidence available when the first lawsuits are brought;
indeed, it may often be the litigation and the ensuing publicity
that spurs scientific interest in studying the question of
causation more carefully.
In cases where the evidence supporting causation is
more limited than one would wish it to be, the questions for the
scientist are particularly difficult: How do you aggregate the
variety of imperfect evidence into a conclusion about general
causation? How do you assess the disparate items and make a
judgment about the probability that the substance is capable of
causing the harm at issue? Evidence synthesis is an especially

34
For discussions of Parlodel, see Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski,
Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 269-70
(2005); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Courts Split on Parlodel: Expert Testimony Good in Ala.,
Rejected in Ill., NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 2001, at A9.
35
Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1998).
36
See id. at 385-86.
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difficult and methodologically fraught area.37 There are
certainly field norms about “hierarchies of evidence” (for
example, randomly controlled trials, or even better, a metaanalysis of a number of different randomly controlled studies
are typically thought of as the “gold standard,” and anecdotal
case observations the weakest forms of evidence38); and there
are rules of thumb about how to assess the likelihood of
causation by looking at a variety of factors. (The well-known
Hill’s criteria, for example, in epidemiology, direct attention to
matters like temporal relationship, dose-response relationship,
biological plausibility, consistency of the observed correlation,
and a variety of other factors.39) But there are not, for the most
part, terribly well-developed methodologies for quantitative
synthesizing of disparate kinds and categories of evidence.
Engaging in evidence synthesis, many scientists would agree,
is as much an art as a science, inevitably involving methods
that are not fully specified and the exercise of experiencebased—and somewhat subjective—judgment.40
Even when the evidence is of a similar kind (perhaps a
variety of different epidemiological studies), and meta-analytic
techniques for formally synthesizing the evidence might be
possible, there must first be a determination about which
evidence is valid enough to be worth considering and which is
not. Reputable, talented scientists may well disagree in good
faith about what evidence is worth counting and what evidence
ought to be dismissed from consideration altogether for
methodological flaws.

37

Although scientists in a variety of fields concern themselves with the
dilemmas of evidence synthesis on a regular basis, there has not been a great deal of
discussion of this issue in the legal literature. See generally COMMITTEE ON DAUBERT
STANDARDS & COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, NAT’L ACAD. SCI.,
DISCUSSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DAUBERT STANDARDS: SUMMARY OF MEETINGS 1116 (Kathi E. Hanna & Anne-Marie Mazza, rapporteurs, 2006).
38
See, e.g., ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH 211 (2d ed. 1986); Robin Harbour & Juliet Miller, A New System for
Grading Recommendations in Evidence Based Guidelines, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 334, 33436 (2001).
39
Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 295-305 (1965).
40
To recognize that complex tasks of evidence synthesis have an inevitable
subjective component using current methodologies is not to disparage the efforts by
scientists to engage in such synthesis. There are, to be sure, significant efforts of this
kind, especially in medicine, efforts to put together systematic reviews of all that is
known and to draw conclusions from them in order to influence clinical practice. The
Cochrane Collaboration is one of the best known and most respected of such efforts. See
generally http://www.cochrane.org/docs/descrip.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
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Take, for example, the important public health question
of whether regular mammograms for all women over the age of
forty can help to reduce breast cancer mortality rates. This
question arose not in the context of litigation, but as a critical
public health issue with implications for what advice doctors
should give to their female patients. Two groups of scientists
carefully studied all the (considerable) available data on the
subject.41 But each group’s decisions about what data
warranted consideration differed.42 A review by Danish
researchers decided that many of the studies had been too
methodologically flawed to warrant consideration, and thus
they based their analysis on a more limited number of studies
that were deemed adequate; the other review, completed by the
United States Preventative Task Force, agreed that many of
the studies were flawed, but determined that the studies it
deemed only “fair” were not so poor in quality that they should
be altogether excluded from consideration.43 Because of these
divergences in what evidence was deemed worthy of consideration, the two studies reached quite disparate conclusions. The
first analysis found that women in their forties do not, in
the aggregate, benefit from mammograms and in fact have
increased risk of harms because of unnecessary treatments and
surgeries that mammogram results generate. The second
study, by contrast, found that mammography did reduce
mortality and was, on balance, beneficial.44 How could qualified
scientists disagree about which studies were even worthy of
consideration? As epidemiologist Steve Goodman wrote in an
editorial on the controversy:
Judgment determines what evidence is admissible and how strongly
to weigh different forms of admissible evidence. When there is
consensus on these judgments and the data are strong, an illusion is
created that the evidence is speaking for itself and that the methods
are objective. But this episode should raise awareness that judgment
cannot be exercised from the process of evidence synthesis and that
the variation of this judgment among experts generates uncertainty

41
See Steve Goodman, Editorial, The Mammography Dilemma: A Crisis for
Evidence-Based Medicine, 137 ANNALS INT. MED. 363 (2002).
42
Id. at 363.
43
Id.
44
See id.; see also Gina Kolata, New Mammogram Studies Divided on
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002.
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What does this public health debate have to do with
experts in court and the limitations of neutral experts? It
provides a dramatic illustration of a generalizeable point: while
the partisanship of experts may create the illusion of
disagreement even when little exists in the broader
community, even in situations far removed from the use of
“hired guns” in court, significant interpretive disagreements
can occur among scientists operating in good faith—and this
may be so even in instances when the available quantity of
data is unusually substantial. Evidence synthesis is an
especially complex and fraught area, one in which reputable
scientists may simply disagree about the extent to which an
imperfect body of data justifies an inference of causation. While
partisanship may exacerbate these differences, and the lure of
high pay may risk creating the appearance of disagreement
when it would be unlikely to exist outside of the courtroom, the
converse is simply not true: interpretive disagreement is not
necessarily the result of partisanship. It may well be the
product of genuine methodological and interpretive differences,
not only across scientific disciplines, but even within them.
Evidence synthesis, to be sure, is simply one salient
illustration of a still more general point: scientific disagreements are not, in and of themselves, a sign that something is
amiss, nor do they necessarily suggest that one or both parties
to the dispute are misbehaving partisans. Quite the contrary;
disagreement is an integral part of scientific processes. What
this means, however, is that the use of neutral experts may
bring with it significant risks.46
To be sure, in those cases in which one side’s experts
are truly charlatans or have been led by partisan zeal to
dramatically overstate some aspects of their testimony,
neutrals could offer an effective and welcome check. But what
would the use of neutrals on a more regular basis mean in
those cases in which the disagreements among experts reflect
legitimate differences, differences that the parties’ experts
would hold equally fast to outside of the context of litigation or
45

Goodman, supra note 41, at 364.
On the advantages and disadvantages of court appointed experts, see
generally Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses, Scientific Positivism
Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 99-121 (1998).
46
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even without the incentive of receiving fees? In such an
instance, a neutral expert would end up doing one of two
things. Perhaps she would support one or the other of the
party’s positions. This might create for the factfinder the
appearance of a consensus view, but this appearance would be
illusory. In such circumstances, the jury would potentially
be misled into being unduly influenced by the structurally
unbiased expert. The jury in such cases might struggle less
with the diverging views of the parties’ experts and simply
choose to rely on the “neutral” expert; while its job might
therefore be perceived as easier, it is not at all clear that the
quality of its decisions would be meaningfully improved.
Alternatively, the court-appointed expert might lay out
the scientific terrain for the factfinder and situate the dispute,
without taking sides at all. This could potentially be educational for the jury, and perhaps a court appointed expert would
be better suited to elucidating the contours of the debate than
the party-selected witnesses.47 But in the end, the jury would be
left in virtually the same place it was before the courtappointed expert assisted it: needing to decide which expert to
believe while lacking the epistemic qualifications to assess the
merits of the testimony.
Those who call for neutral experts, then, at least partly
misunderstand the nature of scientific disputes. For whenever
there is a legitimate scientific disagreement at issue in a legal
case, a neutral expert would either mask a legitimate dispute
or else be unable to offer “those general truths, applicable to
the issue, which they may treat as final and decisive,”48 for
which Learned Hand and others have long craved. In other
words, while neutrals might indeed offer a useful, strong check
on extreme partisanship, this would often be an insufficient
solution precisely because of the factfinder’s continued lack of
epistemic competence.

47
On the tension between education and deference with respect to expert
witnesses, see Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). For a case study of experts who
“sold” their expertise to the courts in explicitly educational terms, see Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and
the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001).
48
Hand, supra note 28, at 55; see Allen & Miller, supra note 47, at 1133.
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The Problem of Epistemic Competence

Let us turn, then, directly to the question of epistemic
competence. Might there be a way to solve this problem? My
focus, again, shall be on the most obvious potential solution:
attempting to make use of decision-makers who themselves
have epistemic competence. How might we do this? One option
would of course be juries made up of experts.49
Even putting aside any potential constitutional
objections (for example, would a jury of experts still be a jury of
one’s peers? would it meet the requirement that a jury come
from “a fair cross section” of the community?), specialized juries
would quickly run up against new difficulties. Just consider
trying to operationalize a system of special juries designed to
deal with concerns about epistemic competence. Who would be
on such a jury? Imagine a toxic torts case involving a plaintiff
alleging harm resulting from the ingestion of a pharmaceutical.
Imagine that the key legal question in the case is causation, as
it so often is in such cases, and imagine further that the
plaintiff has evidence relating to causation from a variety of
sources and scientific disciplines. Let us posit that she has two
epidemiological studies, some evidence from chemical studies of
the drug and related substances, an animal study or two, and
extensive evaluations by several physicians who endeavored to
find the cause of her ailments through “differential diagnosis.”
If our goal is a decision-maker with epistemic
competence, who should be eligible to sit on the jury for such a
case? Just how much should a potential juror have to know
about the scientific disciplines from which the evidence will
come? Should the jury be limited to physicians and professional
research scientists? If so, scientists from what disciplines?
49
See, e.g., Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 35 IOWA
L. REV. 409 (1950); Jeannette E. Thatcher, Why Not Use the Special Jury?, 31 MINN. L.
REV. 232 (1947); William V. Luneberg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified
Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887 (1981); Rita Sutton, A More Rational
Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 575; Dan Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72
JUDICATURE 292 (1989); Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized
Juries: Calling for Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL
& APP. ADVOC. 1 (1998); Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation,
89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980). On the history of the use of quasi-expert juries, see generally
James Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and Its
Relation to Voir Dire Practices: The Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and
Peremptory Challenges, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Oldham,
History]; James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. (1983).
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Should a paleontologist be permitted, or a theoretical physicist?
What about social scientists? Clearly, the boundary-drawing
issues would become immediately significant. An empirical
social scientist might understand the epidemiological evidence
at least as well as many physicians. Moreover, the evidence
presented in the case could be disparate enough that in many
instances no one at all would be a true epistemic insider to all
of the scientific evidence offered. Depending on the matters at
issue, the pool of people truly expert in any of the relevant
areas might be rather small, and the pool of people expert in all
of them might not even exist. Perhaps an epistemically
competent jury need not mean that every juror has epistemic
competence in every expert area at issue; we might be satisfied
with a jury made up of several leading members of each of the
subfields in which significant expert evidence was expected.
As a thought experiment, imagining such a jury is an
interesting prospect. But, in reality, it would raise enormous
practical hurdles. It is simply not realistic to bring the leading
experts in as jurors time after time. Certain kinds of expertise
arise in trials over and over again, and it is likely that the
segment of the population with these forms of expertise would
become massively and unequally burdened by their jury
obligations. Just how often could we ask busy epidemiologists
and toxicologists, for example, to serve on juries? Meeting their
civic duty too often could have devastating effects on both their
income and their career! In addition, scientific subcommunities can be small and professionally interconnected, so
it is likely that some of the most epistemically qualified nontestifying experts would know personally, and have views
about, some of the testifying experts, or even have a prior
opinion about the particular matter at issue. While these
prior views are a direct consequence of the fact of their
expertise, they might generate serious problems vis-à-vis our
expectations of jurors: an expert with a significant degree of
prior relevant knowledge might be unable to hear the evidence
presented with a fresh and open mind. Epistemic competence
might go hand in hand with preexisting judgments about the
merits.
One might argue that the preceding discussion
unreasonably overstates the necessary degree of epistemic
competence. Perhaps it is not necessary to be a scientist within
the relevant field in order to have enough knowledge and
training to evaluate the claims made in the courtroom in a
rational manner. Perhaps the preceding discussion fails to

1030

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

recognize the distinction between an intelligent producer and
an intelligent consumer of knowledge—the skills necessary to
evaluate a claim might be significantly lower than those
needed to be a substantive contributor to the debates of the
field. Even if we assume this to be true, now who could be
included in our epistemically competent jury? If the case
involves a good deal of sophisticated statistical analysis, how
much familiarity should the jury have to have with statistical
thinking in order to be epistemically competent? Some graduate training? A college major in statistics, math, accounting,
or some related quantitative field? Successful completion of a
college course on the subject? Successful completion of an
in-court quiz testing statistical knowledge, or basic numeracy?
Our problem here is a classic dilemma of boundarydrawing. Where do we draw the line between those deemed
adequately epistemically competent and those who are not? If
epistemic competence is tied with a reasonably high degree of
precision to the matters at issue in the case, our jury system
would become literally unworkable. By contrast, one could
probably implement a system that required jurors to have some
undergraduate level science training for cases involving expert
scientific evidence. But this would create other problems. No
longer would there be a direct tie between the factfinder’s
knowledge and experience and the central issues in the case.
Once that direct tie is broken, a system of this sort both smacks
of elitism and begins to look distressingly anti-democratic. How
confident are we that those with a minimum of one science
class in college would actually be better, as a group, than those
who did not meet the standard? How would they compare to
those who went to college but did not take science? To those
who excelled in some high school science class? To those
without a college education but whose present employment
relates to science or technology? To those with a particular I.Q.,
regardless of education?
Unless we have (and perhaps even if we did have) a
well-grounded empirical basis for believing that jurors who met
a particular standard for prior experience with scientific
matters would reach significantly better decisions than those
who lacked the relevant experience, we might well think that
other public values and commitments should prevent us from
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heading down that path.50 In addition, those jurors who met our
epistemic criteria (whatever they were) might be, as a group,
demographically different from those who did not, and in ways
that might be troubling, not only along gender, race, or
ethnicity lines, but also in terms of beliefs relevant to the
case—ideas about politics, notions of fault and liability, or
other less obvious dimensions. We might be consciously giving
up diversity on one dimension (for example, eliminating all
those without a certain degree of scientific background), and
simultaneously giving up diversity along dimensions about
which we were not even aware.
If expert juries may raise difficult concerns, expert
judges might offer a less troubling method to ratchet up the
legal system’s degree of epistemic competence. Judges who
develop a specialty might be better positioned to asses the
expert evidence adduced by parties and to guide both the
parties and the jury through the trial process. Although no
state, to my knowledge, has a court dedicated to cases involving
complex expert evidence in particular, several states are
experimenting with specialty courts or specialized judges
within general courts devoted to business disputes or to
complex civil litigation,51 and this category of case does
typically involve a good deal of expert testimony.
The early response to these innovations appears to be
generally positive.52 However, they cannot be seen as a
particularly robust response to the issue of epistemic
competence. Even if we imagine (though it is far from certain)
50
Delaware has, in fact, a rarely used statute permitting the use of “special
juries” in cases involving complex litigation. See 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506
(2007). The statute is not specific about who counts as a “special juror” or what cases
may qualify for this provision. Id. For discussion of this statute, see Oldham, History,
supra note 49.
51
For an overview of materials from several states relating to specialized
complex litigation efforts, see generally National Center for State Courts, http://
www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopics/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=SpecCt (last visited Feb.
11, 2008). Florida has a dedicated business court in its Ninth Judicial Circuit. See
Business Court: Ninth Judicial District, available at http://www.ninja9.org/Courts/
Business/Forms/ BCBrochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2008). California has a number of
judges who now specialize in complex civil litigation. For a brief description of this
program, see Judicial Council of California, Fact Sheet: Complex Civil Litigation
Program (2007), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets/comlit.pdf;
see also Complex Litigation, Key Findings from the California Pilot Program, CIVIL
ACTION, Winter 2004, at 1; Paul Kiesel & Bryan Borys, The Cost $avings of the
Complex Litigation Program, CAL. COURTS REV., Summer 2007, at 16.
52
See, e.g., Kiesel & Borys, supra note 51, at 20-21; Ronald M. George,
Complex Civil Litigation Pilot a Success, COURT NEWS (Judicial Council of Calif.), Sept.
2001, at 2.
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that the judges in a court devoted to complex civil litigation
increase their sophistication with respect to certain kinds of
repeat-play evidence, the fact remains that in a jury trial, the
judge does no more than rule on admissibility. The jury still
must evaluate the evidence, and the fact that the judge may
have grown to be a more sophisticated consumer of the expert
evidence at issue than the typical judge will not necessarily
translate in any obvious way to increased juror sophistication.
To put it differently, at best these courts might lead to an
improved set of evidentiary inputs for the jury’s consideration—improved in the sense of being more likely to be
epistemically valid. But the extent to which that would
translate into better outputs is not obvious, given the jury’s
own lack of epistemic competence. It probably cannot hurt, but
it might not help much either. Bench trials with specialized
judges would take this a step further—many have suggested,
for example, that a “complexity exception” to the constitutional
right to the jury trial ought to be permitted.53
Could we go one step further and imagine a neutral,
epistemically qualified decision-maker? Could we imagine a
procedure akin to a bench trial, but in which the adjudicator
was not simply a repeat-player judge in a specialized court, but
was in fact an epistemic expert in the matters at issue? Of
course we can imagine it, but at this point, for better or for
worse, we are describing an adjudicatory regime that looks
very little like our jury system. As it happens, however, we do
have examples of precisely such a procedure in actual use:
Some arbitration proceedings make use of an industry expert
as an arbitrator in lieu of someone with legal expertise.54 For
disputes with a high degree of technical complexity, or where
industry norms are explicitly at issue, it is not uncommon for
parties to elect to make use of an epistemically qualified
decision-maker.55 The parties might choose someone with the
53

See sources cited supra note 51.
For discussions of industry-expert arbitrators, see Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Jennifer J. Johnson,
Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84
N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005). Discussions with Robert Mnookin about practices in
arbitration have also informed my understanding.
55
Note, however, that Bernstein found that at least in some industries the
expert arbitrators made surprisingly little use of their insider knowledge of business
norms within the field. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 54, at 1771-87.
54
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appropriate scientific or technical background rather than
someone with a legal background. In a sense, then, for
commercial and contracts disputes, or any other kinds of
disputes for which arbitration is a viable alternative, there
already exists an “opt-in” approach when parties deem an
epistemically-competent evaluator to be an especially high
priority. But while it would be interesting to know more about
how often, and in what circumstances, parties select scientific
or technical know-how over a legal background, this approach
is likely to be attractive to both parties in only a limited
number of cases.
CONCLUSION
Where, then, are we left? Not with solutions, to be sure,
but perhaps with a clearer diagnosis of the dilemmas
surrounding the use of expert evidence within an adversary
system, and their tradeoffs. And perhaps we are left, too, with
a bit more sympathy for Daubert, or at least a recognition that
so long as we have our adversarial system in much its present
form, we are inevitably going to be stuck with approaches to
expert evidence that are imperfect, conceptually unsatisfying,
and awkward. It may well be that the real lesson is this: those
who believe that we might ever fully resolve—rather than
imperfectly manage—the deep structural tensions surrounding
both partisanship and epistemic competence that permeate the
use of scientific evidence within our legal system are almost
certainly destined for disappointment. This ought not to lead
us to quiescence. It ought instead to guide us to a certain
degree of realism and modesty about how much we can change
about the use of expert evidence, unless we are prepared to
make fundamental modifications to our adversarial system.

